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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LEWIS V. HARRIS: A MATTER OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The fight for marriage equality in New Jersey and across the nation is intensifying and 
well chronicled.  In the wake of recent successes in Maine, Maryland and Washington, marriage 
equality advocates in the Garden State are approaching their campaign with renewed fervor.
1
  
This paper will discuss the status of the New Jersey campaign for marriage equality, highlighting 
the history of the marriage equality debate in the state.  The paper will focus on litigation, 
legislation, and possible next steps for marriage equality activists, including: further legislation 
or a legislative override; a public referendum to amend the New Jersey Constitution to provide 
for same-sex marriage; or a victory for marriage equality in the courtroom.  Further, it will pose 
the question of whether the Supreme Court of New Jersey erred in failing to provide full 
marriage equality in Lewis v. Harris
2
 or whether the current state of affairs on this issue is 
inevitable given the political realities of the state.   
Part II of this paper will survey the recent history of the New Jersey campaign for 
marriage equality, both in the courts and in the legislative chambers as well as in the front office 
of the Statehouse in Trenton, New Jersey.  First, the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Lewis v. 
Harris will be discussed, including a critical analysis of the majority opinion’s overly pragmatic 
and deferential approach to the constitutional question of whether a denial of same-sex marriage 
constitutes a due process or equal protection violation under the state constitution.
3
   Part II will 
also focus on then-Chief Justice Poritz’s part concurrence, part dissent, which sternly criticized 
the majority for abdicating its responsibility to adjudicate constitutional questions to the New 
                                                          
1
 Julie Bolcer, Is New Jersey Next for a Marriage Referendum?, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 8, 2012, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2012/11/08/new-jersey-next-marriage-referendum. 
2
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
3
 Id. 
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Jersey Legislature.
4
  The Part will conclude by surveying the various avenues through which 
marriage equality advocates are fighting for full marriage equality in the state.  The political 
quagmire that the Lewis decision created will become evident in assessing the current status of 
the campaign towards marriage equality. 
Part III will provide a constitutional theoretical basis for analyzing the Lewis decision, 
paying particular attention to the theory of popular constitutionalism, which advocates for 
judicial deference to democratic processes.
5
  Under this theory, because of the differences 
between state and the federal constitutions, specifically the penetrability of state constitutions, 
non-judicial actors play a significant role in interpreting state constitutions.  As evidenced in 
Lewis, judicial deliberations and decision-making are influenced by the judiciary’s concern that 
non-judicial actors will mobilize in order to “correct” judicial decisions.  Part IV will examine 
the Lewis decision under the lens of popular constitutionalism, ultimately concluding that Lewis 
v. Harris was wrongly decided.  The court’s pragmatic, minimalist approach in Lewis was overly 
deferential to the democratically elected legislature.  The majority craftily characterized the due 
process issue of denying marriage equality and the question of “what is in a name” as questions 
of policy rather than of constitutional principle in order to avoid answering a question regarding 
a contentious social issue.   
Finally, Part V will stress the importance of the court’s independent role in constitutional 
adjudication.  This role is even more critical when the court is charged with deciding claims 
regarding the civil rights of minority groups.  Yet courts are even more likely to minimize this 
                                                          
4
 Id. at 230 (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
5
 Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L. 
J. 871, 875, 887 (1999). 
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role in equal protection and due process cases involving the rights of insular minorities.
6
  The 
tenets of popular constitutionalism challenge the role of the court as an independent branch, 
serving to check the democratically-elected branches of government.  Ultimately, the majority in 
Lewis abdicated its role as the bulwark of the state constitution, capable of protecting oppressed 
minorities against the power of the democratically elected branches of government and the 
people at large.
7
  Whether categorized as popular constitutionalism,
8
 pragmatic 
constitutionalism,
9
 or deferential minimalism,
10
 the concept that an independent judiciary should 
head to the popular will is troubling because it is antithetical to the premise of American 
government.  Moving forward, if individuals, most significantly socially unpopular minority 
groups, are to be fully protected by the courts, the judiciary must eschew the tenets of popular 
constitutionalism and, instead, embrace its role as an independent branch of government. 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN NEW JERSEY: IN THE COURTS AND IN THE 
LEGISLATURE 
 
 In order to understand the current standoff surrounding the campaign for marriage 
equality in New Jersey, it is important to first survey the principal case of Lewis v. Harris.
11
  In 
Lewis, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that same-sex couples must, on state equal 
protection grounds, be granted the same rights and benefits afforded to opposite-sex married 
couples.
12
    Yet, the court left it to the New Jersey Legislature either to afford same-sex couples 
                                                          
6
 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudications, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958 (2006). 
7
 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
8
 See generally Reed, supra note 5. 
9
 See generally Jeffrey L. Amestoy, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL ISSUE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOREWORD: State 
Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic Constitutionalism -- Reflections on State Constitutional Theory and Same-
Sex Marriage Claims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1249, 1250 (2004). 
10
 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996). 
11
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
12
 Id. 
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the right to marry or to set up a parallel structure with which to allocate the rights and benefits.
13
  
While Justice Albin and the majority took a practical, deferential approach to the due process 
question, Chief Justice Poritz argued for a constitutional purism approach.
14
  The majority’s 
abdication of its responsibility to answer a critical constitutional question and guard the rights of 
insular minorities against the politically powerful
15
 has led to a quagmire in which the political 
realities that accompany a highly debated issue have led to standstill.   
Notably, the remedy the New Jersey Supreme Court contrived was not new.  In Baker v. 
State, same-sex couples brought an action against the government seeking declaratory judgment 
that the refusal to issue them marriage licenses violated marriage statutes and the Vermont State 
Constitution.
16
  The Vermont Supreme Court, under then-Chief Justice Amestoy concluded that 
excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex married 
couples violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.
17
  Yet, the court 
further found that whether these benefits and protections were to take the “form of inclusion 
within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some 
equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature.”18  State constitutional law scholar 
Robert F. Williams described this move by noting that the court “remanded” the case to the 
legislative branch with instructions to act,
19
 in precisely the same manner as the New Jersey 
experience that will now be discussed below.  Upon “legislative remand,” the Vermont 
                                                          
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. at 230 (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
15
 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
16
 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
17
 Id.  Importantly, the New Jersey does not contain the same clause under which the Vermont decision was decided.  
The Common Benefits Clause, the pertinent part of the Vermont Constitution, reads as follows: “That government 
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, 
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part 
only of that community . . . .”  VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7. 
18
 Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
19
 Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from Vermont's State Constitutional 
Case on Marriage of Same-Sex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV 73, 99 (2001). 
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Legislature passed a civil union act.   Yet, in 2009, after experiencing and assessing the failures 
of civil unions, the state legislature amended the Vermont law so as to include same-sex couples 
in marriage and to phase out civil union by 2011.
20
    If the Vermont experience is any indication, 
advocates will be successful in achieving the legality of same-sex marriage in New Jersey, but 
the precise method of success is unclear. 
A. Marriage Equality Litigation: Lewis v. Harris 
 
Lewis v. Harris involved seven same-sex couples-plaintiffs challenging New Jersey’s law 
regarding civil marriage, which restricts civil marriage to heterosexual couples. After being 
denied marriage licenses, the Lewis plaintiffs sought both a declaration that New Jersey law 
violated liberty and equal protection guarantees and injunctive relief compelling defendants
21
 to 
grant plaintiffs marriage licenses.
22
  The state argued that same-sex marriage has “no historical 
roots in the traditions or collective conscience of the people of New Jersey to give it the ranking 
of a fundamental right” and that barring marriage to same-sex couples was a “rational exercise of 
social policy by the legislature.”23  Therefore, the state maintained that any change to the 
“bedrock principle” limiting marriage to heterosexual couples must come from the “democratic 
process.”24 
                                                          
20
 Marc R. Poirier, Lewis v. Harris II — “Civil Union” Versus “Marriage,” One More Time, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Apr. 29, 2010, 2:15 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/lewis-v-harris-ii-civil-
union-versus-marriage-one-more-time.html. 
21
 The defendants included Gwendolyn L. Harris, then Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human 
Services, responsible for implementing the state’s marriage statutes; Clifton R. Lacy, then Commissioner of the 
then-New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, responsible for operating the State Registrar of Vital 
Statistics; and Joseph Komosinski, then acting State Registrar of Vital Statistics, responsible for supervising local 
registration of marriage records.  All defendants’ positions included responsibilities relating to issuing marriage 
licenses.  Id. at 202–03. 
22
 Id. at 202.   
23
 Id. at 205. 
24
 Id. at 206. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the state, concluding that state laws 
relating to marriage did not violate the New Jersey State Constitution.
25
  In so holding, the trial 
court noted that the plaintiffs were not attempting to lift a barrier to marriage, but to “change its 
very essence” and suggested the best avenue for accomplishing this endeavor was through the 
legislature, not through the courts.
26
  A divided three-judge Appellate Division panel affirmed 
the trial court’s decision.27  Basing the affirming decision on the text of the state constitution, the 
state’s history and traditions, and contemporary and social standards, Judge Skillman held that 
“[m]arriage between members of the same sex is clearly not a fundamental right.”28  
Significantly, in his dissent, Judge Collester, who found same-sex marriage to be a fundamental 
right, explained his disagreement with the majority’s perception of the court’s role in the case, 
stating: “we must interpret our Constitution to uphold individual rights, liberties and guarantees 
for all citizens even though our conclusion may disappoint or offend some earnest and thoughtful 
citizens.”29  The New Jersey Supreme Court soon thereafter granted certiorari of the Appellate 
Court decision as a matter of right. 
On October 25, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued its decision in the case, 
considering whether, under the New Jersey Constitution, same-sex couples must be afforded the 
right to marriage and its attendant social and financial benefits and privileges.
30
  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court unanimously decided that same-sex couples are entitled to the same protections 
as heterosexual couples under the New Jersey Constitution, but declined to find that the state 
                                                          
25
 More specifically, the trial court granted summary judgment for the state and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
concluding that marriage was restricted to a man and woman, that same-sex couples did not have a fundamental 
right to marriage, and that state laws related to marriage did not violate the state constitution’s equal protection 
guarantees.  Id. at 203.   
26
 Id.  
27
 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (App.Div.2005).   
28
 Id. at 268.   
29
 Id. at 278 (J. Collester, dissenting). 
30
 Lewis, 908 A.2d 196. 
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Constitution required that marriage be specifically required to confer these protections and 
benefits.
31
  In so deciding, the court expressly deferred to the New Jersey Legislature as to how 
the attendant rights should be acknowledged in a statute.
32
  Two questions were before the court, 
one based on due process rights and one on equal protection considerations:  
In this case, we must decide whether persons of the same sex have 
a fundamental right to marry that is encompassed within the 
concept of liberty guaranteed by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New 
Jersey Constitution. Alternatively, we must decide whether Article 
I, Paragraph 1's equal protection guarantee requires that committed 
same-sex couples be given on equal terms the legal benefits and 
privileges awarded to married heterosexual couples and, if so, 
whether that guarantee also requires that the title of marriage, as 
opposed to some other term, define the committed same-sex legal 
relationship.
33
 
 
1. The Majority’s Deferential Pragmatism  
 
In holding that denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits statutorily afforded to 
heterosexual couples violated the equal protection guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New 
Jersey Constitution, the majority based its conclusion on the State’s legislative and judicial 
commitment to eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
34
  Although finding that same-sex 
couples are entitled to certain rights and benefits, the majority declined to recognize that same-
sex couples had a fundamental right to marriage.
35
   
Following the general Fourteenth Amendment Due Process standard set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court, the majority first addressed the due process claim.  The majority 
reasoned that fundamental rights are only those so “deeply rooted in the tradition, history, and 
                                                          
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. at 222. 
33
 Id. at 200. 
34
 Id.  The text of the constitutional provision in question provides: “All persons are by nature free and independent, 
and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”  N.J. CONST. 
art. I, ¶ 1.   
35
 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200. 
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conscience of the people” to be found to be fundamental.36  In defining the asserted liberty 
interest in question, the court limited its review to same-sex marriage as a fundamental right, not 
the “abstract” right to marriage.37  Despite the “rich diversity of the state, the tolerance and 
goodness of its people, and many recent advances made by gays and lesbians toward achieving 
social acceptance and equality under the law,” the majority did not find same-sex couple’s right 
to marriage to be fundamental.
38
   
The court then turned to the question of whether the state’s marriage laws offend the 
equal protection principles of the state constitution.  The majority rejected a so-called “all-or-
nothing” approach for conducting its equal protection analysis, reasoning that awarding the 
rights attendant to marriage does not necessarily require that same-sex couples be granted the 
right to marry.
39
  The court therefore divided the equal protection issue into two distinct 
questions: “whether committed same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the benefits and 
privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples, and, if so, whether they have the 
constitutional right to have their ‘permanent committed relationship’ recognized by the name of 
marriage.”40 
 Significantly, the majority recognized the unjustified dichotomy between the “seeming 
ordinariness of the plaintiffs’ lives” and the “social indignities and economic difficulties” the 
plaintiffs faced due to the “inferior legal standing” of same-sex couples under New Jersey law.41  
The consequences of this unequal treatment included: the expensive and time-consuming process 
                                                          
36
 Id.  The test the court utilized, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, involved a two-step inquiry.  First, 
“the asserted fundamental liberty interest must be clearly identified” and second, “that liberty interest must be 
objectively and deeply rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people” of New Jersey.   Id. at 206–07 
(citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)). 
37
 Id. at 208.  The court reasoned that: it is “concerned only with the question of whether the right to same-sex 
marriage is deeply rooted in this State's history and its people's collective conscience.”  Id. 
38
 Id. at 211.  
39
 Id. at 202, 206. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. at 202. 
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of cross-adopting each other’s children; paying excessive health insurance premiums; not having 
the right to “family leave;” adverse inheritance tax consequences; and denial of privileges 
customarily extended to family members at medical facilities.
42
  Noting that the judiciary and 
legislature have acted progressively to provide committed same-sex couples a “strong interest in 
equality of treatment relative to comparable heterosexual couples,” the majority concluded that 
denying homosexual couples the rights and benefits afforded to heterosexual married couples 
violated the equal protection guarantee embedded in the New Jersey Constitution.
43
   
The court then turned to the question of whether same-sex couples must be afforded the 
right to marriage itself.
44
  Rather than find that same-sex marriage must be legalized in order for 
marriage laws to be in compliance with the state constitutional mandate of equal protection, the 
majority took a more cautious approach by deferring to the New Jersey Legislature.  The court 
required that the legislature either “amend the marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or 
create a parallel statutory structure” that would provide the “rights and benefits enjoyed and 
burdens and obligations borne by married couples.”45  The majority explicitly stated that the 
proper statutory scheme to define same-sex couples, be it marriage or otherwise, was a question 
to be left to the “democratic process.”46  The majority further noted that if the legislature created 
a “parallel statutory structure” that did not include the title of marriage, the court would not 
presume that such a structure contravenes equal protection principles so long as the parallel 
structure provided the rights and benefits of marriage available to same-sex couples.
47
  In short, 
while finding an equal protection violation, the majority failed to find a constitutional right to 
                                                          
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 215. 
44
 Id. at 206. 
45
 Id. at 200.   
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
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marriage equality, instead leaving it to non-judicial, democratically-elected actors to determine 
the future of same-sex marriage in the state.  
2. The Poritz Dissent: A Constitutional, Not a Political Question 
 
Then-Chief Justice Poritz, joined by Justices Zazzali and Long, concurred with the 
majority that denying the rights and benefits to same-sex couples statutorily afforded to 
heterosexual couples violated the equal protection guarantee of the state constitution.
48
  On the 
fundamental rights claim, Poritz found no “principled basis” to distinguish between the rights 
and benefits flowing from the right to the title of marriage, dissenting both from the majority’s 
bifurcation of the equal protection argument and from the majority’s finding that there was no 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage encompassed within the New Jersey State Constitution’s 
concept of ordered liberty.
49
   
Chief Justice Poritz took particular issue with the majority’s narrow framing of the 
constitutional questions presented.  Criticizing the majority’s characterization of the asserted 
liberty right as limited to same-sex marriage, the Chief Justice noted that the majority avoided 
the “more difficult questions of personal dignity and autonomy” raised by the Lewis plaintiffs.  
Poritz reasoned that the majority’s framing of the due process question as whether there is a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the tradition of the state as suggesting 
the answer—“no.”50  The Chief Justice found the majority’s logic troubling and viciously 
circular: because the right has been historically denied to those who now tried to exercise it, it 
cannot be fundamental.
51
  Conversely, had the majority asked the broader question of whether 
                                                          
48
 Id. at 224 (Portiz, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 227. 
51
 See id. at 227–28. 
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the right to marriage is so deeply embedded in tradition as to be ranked fundamental, the answer 
would be a resounding “yes.”52   
Further, Poritz objected to the majority’s due process analysis, noting that, as the 
Supreme Court of the United States established in Loving v. Virginia,
53
 a right can be deemed 
fundamental even if it is not found in the “historical traditions and conscience of the people.”54  
Again criticizing the majority’s overly narrow analytical framework, Poritz noted that in Loving, 
the Court did not inquire whether interracial marriage was deeply rooted in Virginia’s traditions, 
but simply whether the plaintiffs had a right to marry, even though they had traditionally been 
denied such a right.
55
  Highlighting the lessons of Loving, Chief Justice Poritz concluded that:  
Loving teaches that the fundamental right to marry no more 
can be limited to same-race couples than it can be limited 
to those who choose a committed relationship with persons 
of the opposite sex. By imposing that limitation on same-
sex couples, the majority denies them access to one of our 
most cherished institutions simply because they are 
homosexuals.
56
  
 
In Poritz’s view, the majority entirely failed to address the precise relief sought by the 
plaintiffs: inclusion and participation in the institution of marriage.
57
  While the benefits and 
                                                          
52
 Id. at 228 (citing J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (2001); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)) (noting that the right to marry is fundamental and 
protected by both state and federal constitutions).  
53
 Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
54
 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 228 (Portiz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing id.). 
55
 Id.  To be sure, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has developed substantive due process under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments significantly since 1967. 
56
 Id.  
57
 The dissent noted the plaintiffs’ focus on the significance of the right to marry itself.  As though responding to the 
question of “what’s in a name,” the plaintiffs explained: “When I am asked about my relationship, I want my words 
to match my life, so I want to say I am married and know that my relationship with Alicia is immediately 
understood, and after that nothing more needs be explained;” and: 
When you say that you are married, others know immediately that you have 
taken steps to create something special . . . .  The word ‘married’ gives you 
automatic membership in a vast club of people whose values are clarified by 
their choice of marriage.  With a marriage, everyone can instantly relate to you 
and your relationship. They don't have to wonder what kind of relationship it is 
or how to refer to it or how much to respect it. 
Id. at 226.   
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rights attendant to marriage were important to the plaintiffs, Poritz’s dissent focused on the 
“deep and symbolic significance” of the institution of marriage and the power of language and 
labels to perpetuate prejudice about differences.
58
  As a result, Chief Justice Poritz argued that 
“[t]he question of access to civil marriage by same-sex couples ‘is not a matter of social policy 
but [one] of constitutional interpretation’” best addressed by the courts of law, rather than the 
legislature.
59
   
B. Marriage Inequality in New Jersey: The Failure of Civil Unions in the Wake of Lewis v. 
Harris 
 
As discussed above, in the Lewis decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the 
New Jersey Legislature either to grant same-sex couples the right to marriage or to create a 
parallel statutory structure” that would provide the “rights and benefits enjoyed and burdens and 
obligations borne by married couples.”60  The legislature was given a deadline of 180 days to 
correct the violation.
61
  The New Jersey Legislature, taking its cue from the majority in Lewis, 
                                                          
58
 Id. at 224, 226. 
59
 Id. at 231 (quoting Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 
(Mass. 2004)).  Massachusetts is one of only a few states that have a provision in its constitution permitting or 
requiring its state supreme court to give an advisory opinion to the governor or legislature.  MASS. CONST. ch. 3, art. 
II (“Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to require the opinions 
of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.”).  In 
fact, Massachusetts’ advisory opinion clause is the oldest in the nation.  M.A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the 
Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 214.  Upon request, in February 
2004, the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Court issued their opinion regarding the constitutionality of the 
Massachusetts Senate’s bill Senate, No. 2175, which would have provided for civil unions for same-sex couples 
while statutorily prohibiting same-sex couples for entering into marriage.  Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 
N.E.2d 565, 568.  The bill would provide the legal protections, benefits, and rights and responsibilities associated 
with civil marriage while precluding inclusion in the traditional institution of marriage.  Id.  The majority opinion 
concluded that the proposed legislation would violate the equal protection and due process requirements of the state 
constitution and that the violating provisions were inseverable from the remainder of the bill.  Id. at 572.  The 
Massachusetts’ legislature’s use of the advisory opinion clause in order to avoid adoption an unconstitutional act 
exemplifies a successful dialog between the branches of government in order to protect individuals’ rights. 
60
 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200.  Importantly, as noted above, this is the same remedy that the Vermont Supreme Court 
crafted in Baker v. State.  744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).   
61
 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200.   
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quickly passed the Civil Union Act in December 2006 in order to comply with the equal 
treatment mandate required by the opinion.
62
   
But the New Jersey Legislature also created the Civil Union Review Commission (the 
“Commission”) as part of the Civil Union Act.63  The Commission was tasked with reviewing all 
aspects of the Civil Union Act and was to report its findings and recommendations semi-annually 
to the New Jersey Legislature and Governor.
64
  The Commission was to expire three years after 
its creation, effective February 19, 2007, and was to issue a final report upon its expiration.
65
 
The Commission held public hearings during which many civilly unionized couples 
testified, explaining their experiences in the wake of the Civil Union Act and the failings of the 
civil union system.  During a September 2007 hearing before the Civil Union Review 
Commission panel, hundreds of civilly unionized couples gathered to voice their displeasure 
over the failures of the civil union structure.
66
  After several hearings and considerable fact-
finding, the Commission’s final seventy-nine-page report concluded that the civil union structure 
                                                          
62
 2006 N.J. Laws 103. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Specifically, the duties of the Commission included:  
evaluating the implementation, operation and effectiveness of the act; 
collecting information about the act’s effectiveness from members of 
the public, State agencies and private and public sector businesses and 
organizations; determining whether additional protections are needed; 
collecting information about the recognition and treatment of civil 
unions by other states and jurisdictions including the procedures for 
dissolution; evaluating the effect on same-sex couples, their children 
and other family members of being provided civil unions rather than 
marriage; and evaluating the financial impact on the State of New 
Jersey of same-sex couples being provided civil unions rather than 
marriage. 
Civil Union Review Commission, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/curc.html. 
65
 N.J. STAT. § 37:1-36 (2007). 
66
 Angela Delli Santi, NJ Civil Unions Fall Short, Panel Told, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/26/AR2007042601005.html.  
Repole 
 
15 
 
did not provide full equality to same-sex couples and recommended that the state adopt same-sex 
marriage.
67
   
In short, the Commission concluded that a civil union does not equal a marriage.  Citing 
to “overwhelming evidence,” the Commission concluded that, not only did the Civil Union Act 
fail to provide adequate protections to same-sex couples, as required under Lewis, but it also 
posed economic, medical, and emotional hardships for same-sex couples.
68
  Another major issue 
that the Commission discussed in its report, which was raised by many same-sex couples at the 
various public hearings, is that some employers and hospitals do not recognize the rights and 
benefits of marriage for civil unionized couples.
69
  Therefore, employers deny equal health 
benefits to partners of employees and partners are unable to make important medical decisions 
and to visit partners in the hospital.   
The failures of the Civil Union Act are not limited to the denial of benefits, but are 
inherent in the separate, “parallel” structure itself.  The Commission noted that even if, “given 
enough time, civil unions are understood to provide rights and responsibilities equivalent to those 
provided in marriage,” the separate status of a civil union sends a message to the public that 
same-sex couples are not equal to opposite-sex couples under the law.
70
  While deferring to the 
legislature in Lewis, the majority nonetheless recognized the plight of same-sex couples: “the 
title of marriage is an intangible right, without which they are consigned to second-class 
                                                          
67
 New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, The Legal, Medical, Economic & Social Consequences of New 
Jersey's Civil Union Law 2, Dec. 10, 2008, available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-
.pdf [hereinafter Final Report]. 
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 Susan K. Livio, Commission Says New Jersey Should Allow Gay Marriage, NJ.COM (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/goldstein.html. 
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citizenship.”71  This observation no doubt has proven accurate in light of New Jersey’s 
experience with the parallel statutory structure of civil unions.   
Many scholars have noted that a primary concern related to the separate institution of 
civil unions for same-sex couples is the stigma that comes along with the separate label.  A civil 
union is not a marriage.  As Martha Minow explains: “Human beings use labels to describe and 
sort their perceptions of the world.  The particular labels often chosen in American culture can 
carry social and moral consequences while burying the choices and responsibility for those 
consequences.”72  Given the weight Americans give to labels in order to assess the world around 
them, “language and labels play a special role in the perpetuation of prejudice about 
differences.”73   
Scholars have addressed the question that the New Jersey Supreme Court struggled with 
in Lewis: what is in a name?  As Professor Marc Poirier has described, “the availability of two 
different names will tend to force anyone involved in identifying or even thinking about a couple 
or family relationship to perform the distinction between same-sex and different-sex couples.”74  
As Professor Poirier reasons, although the state may proclaim that civil unions are to be deemed 
the equivalent of marriage, such a “disclaimer is ineffective,” as the legal distinction reinforces 
the everyday practices of categorization, including those practices that are harmful and plausibly 
unconstitutional.
75
    
Until there is but one name to describe a couple who choose to share their lives together 
under the law, same-sex couples will not achieve full equality with their opposite-sex 
                                                          
71
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006). Interestingly, the court concluded that “[u]nder our equal 
protection jurisprudence, however, plaintiffs' claimed right to the name of marriage is surely not the same now that 
equal rights and benefits must be conferred on committed same-sex couples.”  Id. 
72
 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 4 (1990). 
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 Id. at 6. 
74
 Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/”Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 1425, 1480 (2009). 
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 Id. at 1481–82. 
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counterparts.  Therefore, it is constructive to survey the inroads, setbacks, and standstills that 
marriage equality advocates have experienced since the Commission’s final report concluded 
that the Civil Union Act is a failure.  In doing so, it is important to note how democratically 
elected actors are influenced by the political realities regarding such a divisive and highly 
debated issue in order to understand not only why the Lewis majority erred in deferring a 
constitutional question to these actors, but also why it was such a critical error. 
C.  The Fight Continues: The Quagmire in the Wake of Lewis v. Harris 
 
In the wake of Lewis v. Harris
76
 and the Commission’s report signaling the inadequacy of 
the Civil Union Act,
77
 marriage equality advocates and many public officials have responded 
with increased purpose to finally achieve marriage equality.
78
  As the campaign for marriage 
equality continues in both the New Jersey Statehouse and in the courts, it becomes increasingly 
clear just how significant a miscalculation it was for the Lewis majority to defer to the legislature 
on an issue so important and contentious as the rights of a minority group.  By failing to properly 
address the rights of same-sex couples in Lewis v. Harris and instead leaving the issue for the 
political playground that is Trenton, New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court renounced its 
role as ultimate adjudicator of the New Jersey Constitution. The fight towards full marriage 
equality in New Jersey since the Civil Union Commission’s proclamation that the Civil Union 
Act has failed to provide equality highlights how politics can stand as a barrier to justice where a 
court relinquishes its “constitutional duty to redress violations of constitutional rights.”79  
Moreover, as demonstrated by the current state of affairs in New Jersey, the Lewis decision has 
led to a political quagmire in which same-sex couples have been left without a proper remedy.   
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 Lewis, 908 A.2d 196. 
77
 Final Report, supra note 67. 
78
 See, e.g., Tim Eustace, Making Marriage Equality a Reality in New Jersey, BLUE JERSEY (Feb. 24, 2013), 
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1. Legislative Efforts to Achieve Marriage Equality  
 
According to polling data, a majority of New Jerseyans support the legalization of same-
sex marriage and popular support for same sex marriage has steadily increased.
80
  In fact, an 
April 2013 poll showed that support for same-sex marriage is at an all-time high in the state, with 
sixty-two percent of voters in support of marriage equality.
81
  Given the trend towards accepting 
marriage equality
82
 and the Civil Union Commission’s conclusion that the Civil Union Act has 
fell short of providing equality to same-sex couples, one might think that the next logical step 
would be toward full marriage equality in New Jersey.  Nevertheless, though their status has not 
backtracked, the future of the rights of same-sex couples in the state is entirely uncertain.  
Although same-sex couples could achieve marriage equality via a legislative override, public 
referendum, or pending litigation, a direct path to marriage equality is anything but certain.  
  a. Marriage Equality in the Legislature 
One avenue through which advocates have sought to achieve marriage equality is the 
legislative process, yet supporters in the New Jersey Legislature have struggled to achieve 
passage of a true marriage equality bill.  In January 2010, during the last days of the legislature’s 
                                                          
80
 See New Jersey Supports Legal Same-Sex Marriage, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING, July 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP_Release_NJ_0725.pdf; David Redlawsk, Rutgers-Eagleton Poll Finds 
New Jerseyans Support Legalizing Gay Marriage, RUTGERS: EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, Nov. 18, 2009, 
available at http://eagletonpoll.rutgers.edu/polls/release_11-18-09.pdf; Annie-Rose Strasser, Poll: New Jerseyans 
Support Same-sex Marriage, THINK PROGRESS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/tag/marriage-
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http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/support-for-marriage-equality-in-new-jersey-at-all-time-high/.  
82
 For instance, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), and 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 184 L. Ed. 2d 527 (2012), two cases with significant implications on same-
sex marriage in the country.  The Court heard oral arguments on both cases in March, 2013.  See U.S. Supreme 
Court Hears Same-Sex Marriage Arguments, CNN POLITICS (Mar. 27, 2013, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/03/politics/transcript-scotus-same-sex-marriage/.  Moreover, there are now ten 
jurisdictions, including nine states and the District of Columbia, that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  
States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/.  Another six states provide for civil unions.  
Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NCSL (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx.   
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lame duck session and prior to then-Governor Corzine’s departure, the New Jersey Senate voted 
on but failed to pass a marriage equality law; the bill never made it to the General Assembly for 
a full vote.
83
  In February 2012, the next legislative session, the legislature finally passed same-
sex marriage, making New Jersey the third state in the nation to pass a marriage equality bill 
under a governor opposed to marriage equality.  Nevertheless, as he had vowed to do in January 
2012 if the measure passed,
84
 Governor Chris Christie swiftly vetoed the bill.
85
  
The bill, though vetoed, is not yet dead, a fact that has marriage equality advocates 
hopeful.  The New Jersey Legislature has until January 2014 to find the two-thirds supermajority 
needed to override the veto, a move that would require more support from Republican 
lawmakers.
86
  In the Senate, the bill originally passed by a vote of twenty-four to sixteen.  Only 
three more votes are needed to reach a supermajority.  An override in the General Assembly is a 
higher hurdle.  The original vote in the Assembly was forty-two to thirty-three; therefore, twelve 
more affirmative votes are necessary.
87
  In early February 2013, legislators in both the Assembly 
and Senate chambers announced plans to seek to override the veto.
88
  The fact that Washington 
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 Vanessa Juarez, NJ Senate Defeats Same-Sex Marriage Bill, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 7, 2010, 8:59 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/07/new.jersey.same.sex.marriage/index.html; see Matt Friedman, 
Advocates File Lawsuit Hoping to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage in New Jersey (June 29, 2011), 
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fourteen-to-twenty and never made it to the Assembly for a vote.  Heather Haddon, New Jersey Gay Nuptial 
Strategies Take Shape, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2013), 
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 NJ Senate Oks Gay Marriage; Gov. Vows Veto, CBS NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57376958/nj-senate-oks-gay-marriage-gov-vows-veto/. 
85
 Kate Fernike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoes-gay-marriage-bill.html.   
86
Julie Bolcer, Is New Jersey Next for a Marriage Referendum?, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/2012/11/08/new-jersey-next-marriage-referendum.   
After a bill is conditionally vetoed, the legislature has until the end of its two-year legislative term to 
override the veto by a supermajority, or two-thirds, of both houses, revise the legislation, or let it die.  NJ CONST.  
art. V, § 1. 
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 Zack Ford, New Jersey Legislators Will Vote to Override Chris Christie’s Marriage Equality Veto, THINK 
PROGRESS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/tag/marriage-equality-new-jersey/?mobile=nc.   
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D.C. and nine states,
89
 including New York and Connecticut, have legalized same-sex marriage 
may be part of the rationale for the newfound sense of support for an override.
90
  Still, this effort 
will be met with opposition.   
There are significant political implications of a campaign to override Christie’s veto.  The 
New Jersey Family Policy Council, a politically active groups whose mission is to stop what its 
supporters believe to be the breakdown of the traditional family and family values, is committed 
to mobilizing its members and dollars against an override effort and believes the fight to override 
will die in the Assembly.
91
  Because of potential political implications of voting for the override, 
any vote will likely occur only after the upcoming June 2013 primary election.
92
  In order to 
succeed in this new override push, a number of Republican legislators would have to vote for the 
measure and against the powerful and popular Governor Christie.
93
  There are Republicans who 
may vote for the measure, and holding the vote after the June primary would relieve sympathetic 
Republicans from having to go on record in favor of same-sex marriage before the primary 
season in which they may be facing more conservative primary challengers.
94
  Interestingly, 
Steven Goldstein, former Chair of Garden State Equality, New Jersey’s largest civil rights 
advocacy organization, which focuses on LGBT rights, has noted that political realities play a 
significant role in the fight for marriage equality.  Goldstein noted that, if Governor Christie 
considers a run for the presidency in 2016, his stance on same-sex marriage could change given 
that “national polling indicates that voters will continue to become more supportive of marriage 
                                                          
89
 See supra note 82. 
90
 Haddon, supra note 83. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Ford, New Jersey Legislators Will Vote to Override Chris Christie’s Marriage Equality Veto, supra note 87.  The 
political realities of leaving this issue to the legislature to resolve highlights the importance of having a branch of 
government that is largely removed from the political realm to define the constitutional rights of minority groups. 
93
 Haddon, supra note 83. 
94
 Id. 
Repole 
 
21 
 
equality, making the issue a political winner for a Republican, at least in a general election.”95  
As demonstrated, advocates will have to strategize and traverse the extremely precarious 
political thicket if they are to succeed in the legislature.  
  b. Marriage Equality via a Public Referendum 
In addition to a possible legislative override, another strategy supported by some, but 
certainly not all marriage equality supporters, is a public referendum to amend the New Jersey 
Constitution to legalize same-sex marriage.
96
  In his veto message of the same-sex marriage 
legislation outlining his objections and recommendations to the bill,
97
 Governor Christie called 
for a referendum on same-sex marriage in place of legislation legalizing same-sex marriage.
98
    
In support of his actions to veto the legislation, and instead to support a referendum to let voters 
decide, Governor Christie publicly stated that: “this is not an issue that should rest solely in the 
hands of the Senate, or in the hands of the Speaker [of the New Jersey General Assembly] or the 
other 118 members of the Legislature.  Let’s let the people of New Jersey decide what is right for 
the state.”99  Moreover, Governor Christie received much criticism for stating:  "The fact of the 
matter is, I think people would have been happy to have a referendum on civil rights rather than 
fighting and dying in the streets in the South."
100
  Other public officials, led by the Governor, 
have called for a public vote via referendum as a means to defeat the proposal even though the 
legislature was posed to pass it. 
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   Currently pending before the New Jersey Legislature is SCR-88, a concurrent 
resolution
101
 that, if passed by a majority of New Jersey voters after passing both chambers of 
the legislature, would amend the state constitution to define “marriage” as the “the legally 
recognized union of two persons of any gender.”102  Many have expressed that the rights of 
same-sex couples should not be left to a majority of voters because such a move would be 
tantamount to a tyranny of the majority; eliminating the safeguards built into representative 
government poses a special threat to disfavored minority groups.
103
  Columnist Patrick Murray 
warns that the referendum process leaves pressing policy issues to the public, which “lacks both 
access to information and the ability to deliberate . . . which our founders specifically said should 
be left to an informed, deliberative system of representative government,” concluding that “you 
don’t put civil rights to a public vote.”104    
There are widely varying views among proponents as to whether to proceed with the 
referendum.  The current state of the fight for marriage equality poses particular political hurdles.  
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Governor Christie strongly opposes same-sex marriage, but has indicated he would accept the 
results of any public referendum on the topic.
105
  A majority of the legislature, but not yet a veto-
proof majority, supports same-sex marriage, but not a public referendum to amend the New 
Jersey Constitution to allow for same-sex marriage, in part because of the concerns of leaving 
such an issue to a majority vote.
106
  For instance, the Senate President, Stephen Sweeney, has 
publically announced that civil rights should not be put on a ballot for a majority vote.
107
  
Senator Ray Lesniak, a long-time state senator and Democratic supporter of same-sex marriage 
legislation, is quoted as predicting that a referendum could be a “last resort” if the legislative 
override fails, Garden State Equality v. Dow,
108
 currently pending in New Jersey Superior Court, 
proves unsuccessful in achieving marriage equality, and “Christie remains in office with his 
present attitude.”109  Meanwhile, Assemblyman Reed Gusciora, New Jersey’s first openly gay 
legislator and a Democratic Assemblyman who has long championed marriage equality, publicly 
supports a referendum.  Assemblyman Gusciora has introduced a bill that would allow voters to 
approve marriage equality via the ballot and supports a measure being placed on the ballot in the 
November 2013 election.
110
    
  The possibility of a referendum to achieve marriage equality has divided advocates as well 
as public officials.  The referendum does pose advantages: it would allow voters and same-sex 
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marriage proponents to bypass the political standoff between executive and the legislative 
branches in order to force action and to succeed in achieving marriage equality.  Even in light of 
the success of marriage equality referenda in Maine, Maryland, and Washington in the 
November 2012 general election, lawmakers and advocates in New Jersey still object to the 
concept of putting civil rights to a popular vote.
111
  In addition to the problem of putting civil 
rights issues to a popular vote, the acrimony that a public debate about such an issue would spark 
and the potentially harmful implications it would have on the LGBT community are important 
considerations.  Studies have shown that state same-sex marriage referenda have negative 
impacts on the on the LGTB community living in that state, “even if they do not participate at all 
in advocacy.”112  Such effects include “heightened stress—both for LGBT individuals and their 
children—divided families and communities, and extra psychological risk for those who engage 
in the hostile political campaign.”113  The long-term negative consequences of losing such a 
referendum also cannot be overstated.   
   Opponents of a referendum also note practical reasons to avoid a public referendum: how 
extraordinarily expensive and potentially cost-prohibitive it would be to conduct a proper 
campaign in New Jersey’s media market.114  Particularly in the light of the fact that Governor 
Christie will be running for reelection and all legislative seats will be open,
115
 a ballot measure 
during the November 2013 election could draw millions of dollars from out-of-state 
conservatives who oppose same-sex marriage and who passionately view marriage as between 
and man and a woman.
116
  When asked about the possibility of a referendum in New Jersey, 
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Steven Goldstein, former Chair of Garden State Equality, stated that: "A referendum is . . . a 
contest of which side can raise more millions.  A referendum puts a community’s civil rights up 
for sale to the highest bidder . . . ."
117
  He further asked three pointed rhetorical questions:  
Would you want your civil rights to be at the mercy of the 
financial infestation of our political system? Aren’t we sick of the 
Super PAC lies that slice our society with hate? Can you imagine 
the exponential hate – and cost – that would infest a marriage 
equality referendum in hardball New Jersey?
118
 
 
  No bill that would allow for a public referendum in November 2013 has received any 
traction to date in the New Jersey Legislature.  Given the many concerns voiced by marriage 
equality advocates, it does not yet seem to be the next likely course of action in the fight for 
marriage equality. 
 2. Back in the Courtroom to Seek Full Marriage Equality 
 
 While the fate of marriage equality in the legislature and at the ballot box is uncertain, 
advocates continue a multi-pronged approach by also pursuing further litigation in the courts in 
the light of the failures of the Civil Union Act to remedy the plight of same-sex couples.  On 
March 18, 2010, the Lewis plaintiffs filed a motion with the New Jersey Supreme Court in aid of 
litigants’ rights,119 which challenged the inadequacy of the Civil Union Act to fulfill the mandate 
set forth in Lewis.
120
  In consideration of the shortcomings of the Civil Union Act, this petition 
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asked the court to compel the New Jersey Legislature to grant civil marriage to same-sex 
couples.  In response to the motion, on July 26, 2010, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion to 
enforce litigants’ rights, without prejudice.121  In so ruling, the court articulated that the proper 
venue for the action was in the Superior Court.
122
 
 Following the directive of the New Jersey Supreme Court, on June 29, 2011, plaintiffs 
filed a four-count complaint in the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County.  The plaintiffs 
filed both state and federal law claims, including that the Civil Union Act violates both the New 
Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
123
  The 
plaintiffs include Garden State Equality as lead plaintiff, and seven same-sex couples, all 
represented by Lambda Legal. The defendants, like those in Lewis, are named in their official 
capacities based on their respective roles in implementing and enforcing state law.
124
 
 The specific complaints include: a denial of equal protection under Article I, Paragraph 1 
of the New Jersey Constitution; a denial of the fundamental right to marry under Article I, 
Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution; a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; and a the denial 
of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
125
  The defendants moved for the court to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim.   The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the count that same-sex 
couples were denied equal protection under Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey 
Constitution, and granted the motion with respect to the other three claims.  Soon thereafter, the 
plaintiffs moved for the court to reconsider the dismissal of the third claim, that the Civil Union 
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Act denies same-sex of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
126
 
In an unpublished opinion addressing defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, Judge 
Feinberg of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division granted the motion for 
reconsideration.  As a consequence, the case will proceed to trial on the equal protection claims 
under the Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.
127
  In her analysis, Judge Feinberg noted that Baker v. 
Nelson
128
 was no longer controlling precedent.  In Baker, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal 
of a Minnesota Supreme Court judgment holding that a state law defining marriage to be 
between only “persons of the opposite sex” for lack of a federal question under both the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.
129
  Baker, Judge Feinberg reasoned, 
“was decided forty years ago and both doctrinal and societal developments since Baker indicate 
that it has sustained serious erosion.”130   
In coming to the conclusion that Baker is no longer controlling, the judge surveyed the 
changing federal legal landscape in regard to sexual orientation as a protected class.
131
  In this 
regard, Judge Feinberg noted that Baker has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court 
precedent, such as Romer v. Evans
132
 and Lawrence v. Texas.
133
  Judge Feinberg also noted that 
“the denial of the title of marriage to same-sex couples’ relationships has been likened by courts 
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and scholars to other forms of discrimination once considered to be appropriate,” such as 
miscegenation laws or discrimination based on sex.
134
   
Moreover, Judge Feinberg observed that the recent Ninth Circuit case, Perry v. Brown,
135
 
in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower decision finding that Proposition 8, a voter-enacted 
constitutional amendment California limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment singled out 
certain citizens for unfavorable treatment.
136
  Judge Feinberg reasoned that, although  the Civil 
Union Act, unlike Proposition 8, “was intended to confer more benefits on same-sex couples,” . . 
. . the Civil Union act is arguably similar because it singles out a certain class of citizens, namely 
gays and lesbians, for allegedly disfavored treatment.”137  Judge Feinberg therefore concluded 
that, while the Civil Union Act does bestow certain benefits on same-sex couples, it also denies 
these couples the designation of marriage and “allegedly does not bestow upon plaintiffs all of 
the benefits enjoyed” by opposite-sex couples.138  The court was satisfied that there is sufficient 
state action to permit the claim under the Federal Equal Protection Clause to proceed.
139
  This 
case is still pending.  As will be discussed below, this case provides an opportunity to learn from 
the Lewis decision and to finally grant marriage equality to same-sex couples in New Jersey. 
 
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AS A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 2006 LEWIS V. HARRIS 
DECISION 
  
Given the failings of the Civil Union Act and the current disorder surrounding the fight for 
                                                          
134
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marriage equality, it is helpful to understand the majority’s analysis in Lewis under a state 
constitutional law framework.  States constitutions are profoundly different from the United 
States Constitution in their origin, function, form, and quality and therefore must be understood, 
evaluated, and utilized on their own terms.
140
    In this regard, state constitutional scholar Robert 
F. Williams summarizes the primary characteristics upon which state constitutions differ from 
the federal model, including: their length, which is in part due to the states’ broader range of 
plenary authority; their inclusion of policy matters that could be treated by legislation; and the 
state constitutions’ relative ease of revision and amendment.141  It is the final distinguishing 
factor that will be the primary basis of this theoretical discussion. 
Relatively speaking, a state constitution is much easier to amend than the federal 
Constitution.
142
  Therefore, as Professor Williams concludes, it is easier to “correct an error” 
made by a state court interpreting a state constitution.
143
  Williams identifies two paramount 
reasons why state constitutions are more easily penetrable by democratic majorities: the process 
of selection of state supreme court justices and the methods of adopting and/or modifying 
constitutions to achieve social change.
144
  States currently employ various methods for selecting 
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 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 20, 36 (2009). 
141
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142
 Robert F. Williams, American Constitutional Law at 4, 
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/williams.pdf.  As discussed above, supra Part II.D, it has not proven 
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constitutions can be amended vary by state.  Id. at 87–88, 359–99.  In addition to that the fact that states vary with 
respect to direct democratic methods available to amend their respective constitutions, see Repole, supra note 103, 
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people on the ballot.  NJ CONST. art. IX, ¶¶ 1–7.  Conversely, in California, citizens need only acquire signatures 
equaling eight percent of the number of citizens who voted in the most recent gubernatorial election in order to 
present a constitutional amendment to the electorate.  CA CONST., art. II, §8. 
143
 Williams, American Constitutional Law, supra note 142, at 4. 
144
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adopt or amend constitutional text, particularly through constitutional initiatives and referenda.  Id. at 888. 
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state supreme court justices, such as partisan election, nonpartisan election, election by 
legislature, gubernatorial appointment, as is the process in New Jersey, and merit selection.
145
  
Selection by popular vote certainly raises concerns about the independence of the judiciary.  Yet,  
for purposes of the present discussion, this first point is of little relevance, as New Jersey’s 
judiciary are appointed and confirmed by the Senate and, in contrast to many states’ judiciaries, 
are not elected.
146
   
  As to the second point, that state constitutions are more easily modified, New Jersey does 
have methods through which democratic majorities can modify the constitution.  In regard to the 
penetrability of state constitutions, one reason for this is the use of direct democratic methods to 
amend state constitutions.  Direct democracy is “the process by which voters directly decide 
issues of public policy by voting on ballot propositions.”147  While a number of states have some 
form of direct public lawmaking method, be it the initiative, referendum, or recall,
148
 these 
mechanisms of popular voter participation in governing and constitution-making have never 
been adopted in the federal constitutional model.
149
  There are generally two subgroups of direct 
democratic methods: substitutive and complementary.
150
  Substitutive direct democracy allows 
the public to bypass the government completely, thereby substituting popular lawmaking for the 
representative process.
151
  The initiative, the most common form of substitutive direct 
democracy, allows citizens to propose legislative measures or constitutional amendments to be 
placed on a ballot for a popular vote.
152
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Conversely, complementary democracy does not allow voters to entirely bypass the 
government.  The referendum is the most common form of complementary democracy and 
“refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their approval or rejection.”153  In this 
scenario, the electorate and legislature act jointly in order to ratify a measure.
154
  The recall is a 
procedure by which the electorate can remove a public official by submitting a petition required 
to allow the entire electorate to vote on the tenure of the public official.
155
  New Jersey’s 
Constitution allows for a form of popular referendum, whereby the legislature first enacts a 
measure and then poses it to the electorate to vote on before the measure can go into effect.
156
  
The electorate cannot directly propose a constitutional amendment in the state. 
In light of these differences between the federal Constitution and state constitutions, 
constitutional scholars have theorized about how the approaches of the state and the Supreme 
Court of the United States vary with respect to constitutional interpretation given the potential 
influence of non-judicial actors in the state model.  In 1999, Professor Douglas Reed coined the 
term “popular constitutionalism” to describe his theory that  the "processes of generating state 
constitutional meanings . . . are subject to much more intense political disputation by interests 
and coalitions of interests than is the Federal Constitution."
157
  Constitutional scholar Mark 
Tushnet describes the premise of popular constitutionalism as a dialogue—constitutional law as a 
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conversation between the people, legislatures, executives, and courts.
158
  Under this view, it is 
the interaction and conversations between non-judicial and judicial actors that produce 
constitutional law.
159
  According to Professor Tushnet, what is most noteworthy about popular 
constitutionalism is that the courts “have no normative priority in the conversation.”160 
Popular constitutionalism stems from the understanding, as expressed by Professor 
Williams, that state constitutional questions should not be approached in the same manner as the 
federal Constitution.  One difference posed by Professor Reed is that state constitutionalism is 
subject to far more intense political debate by special interest coalitions than its federal 
counterpart, whereby non-judicial actors who vie strategically against one another to advance 
their understandings of state constitutional meanings play an integral role.
161
  The role of non-
judicial actors, Reed posits, is justified by the fact that state constitutions give great credence and 
power to democratic majorities, which in turn invites and encourages contestation and dispute.
162
  
To that end, according to Professor Reed, state constitutional law is often sustained and 
developed by the political activities of interest groups and social movements to a much greater 
degree than by judicial actors.
163
  Therefore, state constitutional meaning is derived from the 
interplay between judicial interpretation and extra-judicial mechanisms, such as popular 
mobilization.  Accordingly, under this theory, state constitutional law is not defined by the courts 
alone and is more readily influenced by political processes and public mobilization.
164
 
 In particular, Professor Reed has noted that legal mobilization, through public interest 
litigation, and voter mobilization, through ballot initiatives, have diminished the judge’s role in 
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determining the meaning of state constitutional provisions as they relate to gay rights and same-
sex marriage.
165
  He argues that this phenomenon shows that state judicial determinations of 
controversial state constitutional rights questions are rarely final and that the court of public 
opinion will likely prevail, even where the political implications are messy and 
confrontational.
166
  Reed argues that the judiciary’s awareness of the potential for popular 
mobilization of non-judicial actors influences judicial deliberations and decision-making.  In 
addressing the Vermont Supreme Court decision of Baker v. State,
167
 Professor Reed noted that 
the Vermont Supreme Court was aware that a decision mandating same-sex marriage “outright 
might face intense opposition.”168  This court explicitly noted that “judicial authority is not 
ultimate authority.”169  According to Professor Reed, this, “in a nutshell, is the lesson of popular 
constitutionalism.”170 
 Furthermore, Professor Reed argues against the longstanding presumption of judicial 
supremacy in determining the law, arguing that non-judicial actors may properly be a part of the 
process.  Indeed, Professor Reed even takes issue with Chief Justice John Marshall’s edict from 
Marbury v. Madison,
171
 at least as it applies to state constitutionalism.  Chief Justice Marshall 
reasoned in Marbury: “It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls 
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an 
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ordinary act.”172  In the famous words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[it] is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”173  Professor Reed objects 
to the dichotomous nature of Marshall’s constitutional theory, taking issue with the notion that 
there is no middle ground between the constitution being superior and unchanged by ordinary 
means and the constitution merely being on the level of ordinary legislative acts.
174
  
Critical to the popular constitutionalism analysis is the importance of politics to the 
constitutional process.  Former Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court Jeffrey L. 
Amestoy,
175
 in considering Professor Reed’s theory of popular constitutionalism, describes his 
own state constitutional law approach as “pragmatic constitutionalism.”176  Amestoy notes that 
constitutional interpretation is not exclusively reserved for judges under the popular 
constitutionalism paradigm.
177
  As Amestoy asserted with regard to state constitutional 
interpretation, “law and politics matter. The inter-relationship of ‘politics’ (and by ‘politics’ I 
mean the recognition that the state constitutional framework empowers a citizenry to alter state 
constitutions by much more direct political activism than is possible in the federal context) and 
"law" is more subtle than is generally recognized.”178 
Proponents of popular constitutionalism contend that the court should not necessarily 
abrogate its role as a counter-majoritarian institution, but should be cognizant of non-judicial 
actors in crafting state constitutional law.
179
  If the court is not the only player in defining state 
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constitutional law, the primary role of the court becomes persuasiveness.
180
  Justices can serve as 
supervisors of the process who offer guidance to the legislature through statements of principle, 
but allow for the non-judicial actors to formulate a solution.
181
   
Although Reed’s popular constitutionalism is based on the premise that state 
constitutionalism differs from federal constitutionalism because state constitutions are generally 
more amendable to democratic process, scholars have also applied popular constitutionalism 
tenets to federal constitutional theory.  This scholarship, though focusing on federal law, is 
nonetheless instructive in placing the Lewis majority’s pragmatic approach in perspective.  For 
instance, popular constitutionalism reflects at a state level the theory that Professor Sunstein 
refers to as “decisional minimalism,”182 whereby a court decides “as little as necessary to justify 
an outcome.”183  Professor Sunstein proposes that courts should avoid certain important 
decisions in order to ensure they are decided by democratically accountable actors.
184
  Therefore, 
under the minimalist paradigm, the court is justified in leaving open “the most fundamental and 
constitutional questions” in order to promote democratic accountability and deliberation.185  
Professor Sunstein further maintains that minimalism is most important when a court is 
faced with an issue that is particularly divisive or hotly debated in the public sphere.
186
  Like 
Professor Reed’s approach to state constitutionalism, Professor Sunstein advocates for a 
pragmatic, cautious approach because of the potential for a backlash to an unpopular decision 
given the contentious nature of the same-sex marriage issue.  Most critically, Professor Sunstein 
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advocates for judicial prudence before asserting “even a correct principle against a democratic 
process that is not ready for it.”187  Professor Sunstein goes so far as to recommend that the Court 
should stay away from the issue of same-sex marriage, “whatever it may be thinking about the 
merits of the underlying constitutional claims.”188  Similarly, state constitutional scholar and 
theorist Professor Reed argues that the resolution of contentious issues, such as gay rights and 
same-sex marriage, through popular constitutionalism may provide greater legitimacy to the 
eventual victories that advocates will achieve.
189
   Minimalism, according to Professor Sunstein, 
is advantageous because it allows for greater involvement and input from other branches of 
government by allowing “the democratic process room to adapt . . . .” and maneuver.190  Though 
such an untidy, deferential, and indefinite adjudication may not sit well with some, Professor 
Sunstein justifies such untidiness as necessary when a democracy is in moral flux, because courts 
may not have the best or the final answers.
191
  Courts ought, to and are justified by, proceeding in 
a manner that recognizes that the judiciary is but one participant in the system of democratic 
deliberation.
192
   
Moreover, Professor Eskridge has offered that judicial deference can also increase 
tolerance in the long run while mediating social clashes in the short run.
193
  Under what he refers 
to as the “jurisprudence of  tolerance,” Professor Eskridge proposes that the judiciary should be 
cautious when traversing certain legal issues and should adopt more conservative judicial 
strategies for dealing with cultural clashes by operating “to lower the stakes of identity politics 
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and culture clashes.  The Court's moderating role is especially important when warring identity 
groups threaten to radicalize politics.”194  In short, he proposes that there are long-term benefits 
to deference.  Popular constitutionalism, at the state level, appears to reflect these various, yet 
fundamentally similar scholarly theories. 
  The practice of judicial deference is not merely a theory.  As Professor Schapiro noted, 
state court deference to state legislatures continues to be strong.
195
  Similarly, Professor Suzanne 
Goldberg has noted that, when views about social groups, such as gays and lesbians, are in flux, 
courts considering equal protection and due process claims “go to great lengths to avoid 
acknowledging their central role in substantiating either the ‘old’ or ‘new’ norm.”196  Professor 
Goldberg likewise concludes that the courts are “inescapably involved in absorbing, evaluating, 
and influencing” popular judgments regarding certain social groups, yet seek to obfuscate their 
judicial role, particularly in regard to the rights of a social group about whom social judgments 
are in flux.
197
   
 This state constitutional interpretation theoretical foundation is important to keep in mind 
in turning back to the decision of Lewis v. Harris.  Although state constitutionalism may be 
distinct in that the process by which the state constitution is created, revised, and amended 
allows for greater interplay between democratic majorities, it does not necessarily follow that the 
process of interpretation requires an indeterminate process open to non-judicial actors.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s hesitation may have been a pragmatic strategy to avoid having to declare 
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a potentially unpopular constitutional principle, even a correct principle, “against a democratic 
process that [was] not ready for it.”198  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision has led to an 
unproductive stalemate.
199
  
IV. LEWIS V. HARRIS: A FAILED POPULAR DIALOGUE 
 
Understanding the Lewis decision in light of the popular constitutionalism paradigm is 
constructive. Such an analysis illustrates the consequences of a judiciary deferring to non-
judicial actors when defining constitutional rights, particularly where the right in question 
involves a minority interest.  To do so, it is helpful to also consider the analyses employed in the 
Baker v. State decision, which the Lewis Court’s strategy largely mirrored.200  The majority in 
Lewis, in “remanding”201 to the New Jersey Legislature, was clearly conscious of the divisive 
nature of the issue of same-sex marriage.  As the majority noted, there was and still is a 
“nationwide public debate raging over whether same-sex marriage should be authorized under 
the laws or constitutions of the various states.”202  There is little doubt that the court’s awareness 
of the potential push-back of an unpopular decision played a role in the majority’s analysis.203 
Ultimately, Lewis was wrongly decided.  For marriage equality advocates to succeed in their 
fight in the New Jersey courts, the state courts must take a constitutional purism approach, as 
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advocated by Chief Justice Poritz in Lewis.
204
  What has occurred in the state since the Lewis 
decision is perhaps precisely what Professor Tushnet described as a dialogue,
205
 but a failed 
dialogue. 
A. Popular Constitutionalism and Lewis v. Harris 
 
Vermont Supreme Court Justice Denise Johnson dissented in Baker v. State on grounds 
similar to those of Chief Justice Poritz in Lewis.  Justice Johnson concluded that the Vermont 
Supreme Court’s act of “remanding” to the legislature “abdicates [the] Court’s constitutional 
duty to redress violations of constitutional rights.”206  Analyzing the Vermont Supreme Court 
Baker decision, Professor Williams noted that, in deferring to the legislature to craft a remedy, 
the Vermont court was influenced by other states, such as Hawaii, where a state constitutional 
amendment following the unpopular opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court
207
 overturned the 
court’s holding.208  Chief Justice Amestoy explicitly acknowledged these events as instructive 
when he criticized Justice Johnson’s dissent as being “significantly insulated from reality.”209  
Further, as Professor Williams noted, Chief Justice Amestoy “acknowledged the fact that state 
constitutions present somewhat of a paradox when guaranteeing rights, because judicial rights 
interpretation can be overturned by a mere majority vote through state constitutional 
amendment” in many states.210  
                                                          
204
 Lewis, 908 A.2d at 230 (Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
205
 Tushnet, supra note 158, at 999. 
206
 Baker, 744 A.2d at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
207
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that refusing to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples qualified as sex discrimination under the state’s constitution.  Id.  In 1998, in 
response to this decision, Hawaii state legislators proposed a referendum limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, 
which was approved by the electorate.  Ballotwatch 2008, Same Sex Marriage: Breaking the Firewall in California, 
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE 1 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202008-
2%20%28Marriage%29.pdf. 
208
 WILLIAMS, supra note 140, at 99.  A similar amendment also passed in Alaska.  Id.; ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25 
(“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”).  
209
 Baker, 744 A.2d at 898. 
210
 WILLIAMS, supra note 140, at 99.    
Repole 
 
40 
 
Perhaps keeping in mind the principles of popular constitutionalism, as the Baker Court 
ostensibly did, the Lewis majority noted that determining whether a particular right is so critical 
to the concept of ordered liberty to be ranked fundamental requires “both caution and 
foresight.”211  There is no doubt that not all rights are fundamental within the due process 
analysis.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, the United States Supreme Court has warned 
against a “liberty protected by the Due Process Clause” being “subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”212  Again in a cautious manner, the Lewis majority 
warned against imposing the court’s “personal value system on eight-and-one-half million 
people” under the guise of newly found rights effectively bypasses “the democratic process as 
the primary means of effecting social change in this State.”213  While recognizing that the court 
need not look beyond state borders for the source of rights defined under the New Jersey 
Constitution, the court, perhaps looking for further justification for its decision, still noted that 
that no jurisdiction, not even Massachusetts, has declared that there is a fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage under either the federal constitution or its own.
”214 
 
What is perplexing about the Lewis decision is the court’s juxtaposition of the importance 
of judicial independence in limiting the power of government to oppress minorities and, at the 
same time, the need to defer to the legislative branch of government.  The court recognizes its 
responsibility “to decide constitutional questions, no matter how difficult,” yet notes that 
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deference to the legislature is a cardinal principle of “our law.”215  The majority went so far as to 
conclude that the “constitutional relief that we give to plaintiffs cannot be effectuated 
immediately or by this Court alone.”216  While denouncing any suggestion that the court was 
trying to influence the legislature, it announced that it would not only leave it to the legislature to 
come up with the appropriate remedy, but that, whatever course of action the legislature takes, 
the court’s starting point “must be to presume the constitutionality of legislation.”217   
Harkening to the lessons of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, the majority 
discussed the independent judiciary’s role as the bulwark of the Constitution against legislative 
encroachment because the judiciary is the only branch of government capable of protecting 
oppressed minorities against the power of the democratically elected branches of government.
218
   
Therefore, it is clear that the majority was aware of its responsibility as a countermajoritarian 
institution to protect insular minorities.
219
  Significantly, Justice Albin left open the possibility 
that the parallel structure created by the legislature could violate the rights of same-sex couples, 
but that “[a] proper respect for a coordinate branch of government counsels that [the court]  defer 
until it has spoken.”220  To hold otherwise would “short-circuit the democratic process from 
running its course.”221   The court did not, however, discuss how to determine when exactly the 
democratic process has run its course.   
B. Lessons from Lewis and the Future of Marriage Equality in New Jersey 
 
The court’s responsibility is constitutional adjudication, but that should not suggest that 
the court must “steer clear of the swift and treacherous currents of social policy” where the court 
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is navigating uncharted constitutional territory.
222
  Yet, the majority in Lewis adopted a 
pragmatic approach, reasoning that, “profound change in the public consciousness . . . must 
come about through civil dialogue and reasoned discourse, and the considered judgment of the 
people in whom we place ultimate trust in our republican form of government.”223  The 
majority’s concern for letting the democratic process “run its course”224 eclipsed the court’s 
responsibility to adjudicate constitutional issues.  As previously discussed,
225
 a premise of 
popular constitutionalism is that the court should “defer” to non-judicial actors in regard to 
highly contested issues so that when change does occur, the public is more willing to accept it.  
Polls in New Jersey suggest that a clear majority of New Jerseyans support the legalization of 
same-sex marriage.
226
  Yet, as detailed above,
227
 the status of same-sex marriage has not changed 
since Lewis and the future of legalization, left to the devices of democratic majorities, is 
uncertain.   
Although the majority in Lewis took a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation, 
ultimately the decision was wrongly decided because equality is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, not merely a matter of public policy.
228
  The court should have followed Chief 
Justice Poritz’s approach and affirmatively decided the due process and the label of marriage 
issues regardless of concerns about the after-effects of an unpopular decision.  As Chief Justice 
Poritz reasoned, the plaintiff’s interests in Lewis arose out of constitutional principles integral to 
the operation of liberty of a free people.
229
  While there may be no way to separate the law from 
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politics in the practice of constitutional law and interpretation,
230
 the court should not freely 
abdicate its responsibilities as an independent branch of government.
231
 
Simply because other non-judicial actors ostensibly play a larger role in defining the law 
of the state,
232
 this should not necessarily be a justification for the courts to defer to these actors, 
particularly on fundamental right and equal protection matters.    It more reasonably follows that 
the constitution’s penetrability should be cause for vigilance, not acquiescence.  There certainly 
may be some middle ground between an impenetrable constitution and one that is no different 
than ordinary legislation.
233
  Nevertheless, though increased activity on behalf of the other 
branches increases total involvement, the process of organized liberty should not be seen as a 
zero-sum experiment.  For instance, Professor Schapiro suggests that the judiciary can 
“coordinate” with the other branches in interpreting the constitution without deferring to the 
other branches of government.
234
   Professor Shapiro further reasons that “the case for 
independent executive and legislative interpretation builds on the case for independent judicial 
interpretation.”235  Coordinate action among the branches “merely recognizes the voices” of the 
other branches of government, “it does not silence the Judiciary.”236   
A constitutionally defined right is a right no matter how the public may respond to a 
judicial opinion recognizing such a right.  In perhaps the most important footnote written in an 
opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that it should act to improve the democratic character of 
government by protecting those groups that are especially at risk because democracy, thus far, 
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has failed to be democratic enough to include them.
237
  Federalist No. 78, though of course 
referring to the structure of the federal judiciary, is nonetheless noteworthy here.  Although the 
judiciary has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, its power lies in its completely 
independent judgment.
238
   
Most troubling about a pragmatic, deferential state constitutionalism approach under the 
popular constitutionalism paradigm is the proposition that court practice prudence in asserting a 
correct principle against a democratic process that is not ready for it.
239
  Justice Amestoy’s 
proposition, that the court’s role in defining constitutional law is persuading non-judicial actors 
by offering guidance but avoiding formulating a solution,
240
 falls short of encapsulating the role 
of the court: to provide a solution, a remedy.  At times, the right decision is not popular, but it 
does not make it less right under the law.  Although democratic majorities may have an easier 
time penetrating, revising, and amending a state constitution rather than the federal Constitution, 
it does not necessarily follow that the court should abdicate any of its responsibility to interpret 
that constitution as it now stands.  Politics cannot matter more than law if the judicial branch 
functions as designed.
241
  The question of access to civil marriage by same-sex couples “is not a 
matter of social policy but of constitutional interpretation.”242  It is a question for the court to 
decide.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
  Whether categorized as popular constitutionalism,
243
 pragmatic constitutionalism,
244
 or 
deferential minimalism
245
 the concept that an independent judiciary should head to the popular 
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will is troubling because it is antithetical to the premise of American government.  As the 
architect of the United States Constitution, James Madison, warned, “If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.”246  Although state constitutions may vary from 
their federal counterpart in that they are more easily modified, state courts should not forgo the 
lessons of the founders regarding the rights of disfavored minorities.  Rooted in the pragmatic, 
strategic approach to constitutional interpretation is the proposition that certain decisions, even 
though perhaps ultimately “right,” are not yet ready to be decided.247  This concern regarding the 
price of potential error and the cost of an unpopular decision can and will lead to fundamental 
unfairness.
248
     
The ultimate misstep in emphasizing an overly pragmatic, minimalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation, particularly when the rights of insular minorities are at issue, is that 
the independent judiciary, who is charged with protecting these individuals from governmental 
intervention, is displaced with the democratic processes of non-judicial actors who may seek to 
attack these same rights.  This proposition is not to suggest that there is no place for democratic 
processes in policy setting.  Such a suggestion is utterly baseless in the American and New 
Jersey experience.  What this paper hopes to suggest is that the presence and power of these non-
judicial actors should be reason for the court to hold tight to its responsibilities, not to yield 
them.  It is not a question of judicial supremacy, but of judicial independence.  Lewis v. Harris 
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may have led to cacophonous conversation between the people, legislatures, executives, and 
courts,
249
 but it has been a failed dialogue.  
                                                          
249
 See supra text accompanying notes 117–19.  
